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This paper focuses on intergenerational welfare effects of fiscal deficits in an OLG model with
wage bargaining and equilibrium unemployment. Changes in wage and profit tax rates alter the
intergenerational distribution by affecting capital accumulation as well as the price of a fixed
asset. The welfare effect on the first old generation crucially depends on the tax instruments
applied. The intergenerational welfare effects of postponing labor taxes are qualitatively similar
to the effects in a model without unions. Increased union power will depress output and the
asset price, but the sign of the welfare effect in steady state is nevertheless ambiguous.
JEL classification: E62, H60
Acknowledgement: I wish to thank Michael Hoel, Søren Bo Nielsen, Agnar Sandmo and
seminar participants at EPRU (Copenhagen), University of Oslo and University of Bergen for
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Keywords: Fiscal deficits, Intergenerational welfare, Union power
                                                       
* Address of correspondence: Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration, N-5035 Bergen-Sandviken, Norway. Telephone: 47 55959278, fax: 47 55959543, email:
erling.steigum@nhh.no1
1.  Introduction
As a result of the remarkable growth of public debt and unfunded social security in many
OECD countries since the1970s – amplified by population aging and the slow-down of
productivity growth – the attention of economists as well as policy-makers has been drawn to
the potentially harmful long-run effects of lenient fiscal policies on the distribution of welfare
between present and future generations. Indeed, in the 1980s one witnessed an upsurge of
research on the intergenerational welfare effects of fiscal deficits – including the international
spill-over effects transmitted through global capital markets - see e.g. Blanchard (1985),
Persson (1985), Frenkel and Razin (1986), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Kehoe (1987),
Fried and Howitt (1988), Chang (1990), Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991) and Buiter
and Kletzer (1991). Building on the seminal contributions by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond
(1965), this literature has identified two distinct channels through which public debt policy
affects intergenerational distribution, namely capital accumulation and price changes of assets
traded among members of different generations.
1
In this literature, the labor market is conventionally assumed to be perfectly
competitive. In many OECD countries, however – particularly European countries where
union power in wage bargaining is institutionalized
2 – rates of unemployment and public
spending on unemployment benefits have been quite high for a long time. This suggests that
the real burden of public debt and unfunded social security should not be seen in isolation from
the burden of high equilibrium unemployment. Indeed, it could be worthwhile to extend the
analysis of intergenerational welfare effects of public debt to an analytical framework
permitting union power in wage bargaining, equilibrium unemployment and public spending on
                                                       
1 The asset price effect plays a crucial role in Fried and Howitt (1988). A related study with a somewhat
different focus is Chamley and Wright (1987).
2 According to Layard et al. (1991), in most European countries over three-quarters of the work force have
wages that are covered by collective bargaining.2
unemployment benefits. This extension of the analysis could also clarify the extent to which
previous results in this literature hinge on the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor
market. Since workers and capital owners on average represent different age groups, wage
bargaining between labor and capital opens up an additional channel of intergenerational
redistribution which is not present in competitive overlapping generations models. Taking
wage bargaining and unemployment benefit rules into account could therefore add to our
understanding of the intergenerational welfare effects of fiscal deficits and unfunded social
security in unionized economies.
3
This paper intends to cast light on these questions. We analyze an overlapping
generations model of a small open unionized economy in which the government’s debt policy
affects intergenerational distribution through capital accumulation and asset price changes. The
model also permits an analysis of the distribution of welfare between employed and
unemployed individuals, as well as of the distribution and welfare effects of changes in the
bargaining power of trade unions. Although there has been a growing interest in trade union
behavior in the context of long-run growth models (see e.g. Devereux and Lockwood (1991)
and Croix and Licandro (1995)), so far the intergenerational welfare effects of fiscal deficits
have not received much attention.
4
In the next section, we present the model. Section 3 analyzes the transitional and
stationary equilibrium effects of a permanent increase in public debt. Section 4 considers the
intergenerational distribution effects of increased union power. The conclusions are
summarized in the final section.
                                                       
3 As demonstrated by Devereux and Lockwood (1991), bargaining between unions and capital owners could
matter for intergenerational distribution even if full employment prevails. Our focus is however different from
the latter paper which was concerned with the general equilibrium effects of a move from binding to non-
binding wage/employment contracts.
4 An interesting paper by Jensen (1997) adopts a computable overlapping generations model of the Blanchard
(1985) type to adress the public debt problem in Denmark. Apart from the questions that are adressed, the
modeling of union behavior and asset markets are also quite different from ours, however.15
owners from the entire tax burden. If the fiscal deficit is generated by a profit tax cut, we
showed that no intergenerational redistribution occurs (Ricardian equivalence). This is also the
case if there is no union power. If a wage tax cut generates the fiscal deficit, however, the sign
of the welfare effect on the first old generation is ambiguous. It could be positive, in which
case the policy involves a Pareto improvement.
The effects of increased union power were also considered, assuming that the wage tax
rate was adjusted to prevent fiscal deficits. The first old generation will loose because profits as
well as the asset price will fall. Increased union power will depress output and the asset price,
but the sign of the welfare effect in steady state is nevertheless ambiguous and could be
positive if the demand for labor is sufficiently inelastic.18
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